

The Alleged British and US Role in the Start of September Kurdish Revolution of 1963 against Qasim

Dr. Othman Ahmed Muhammed Ali

Department of History - College of Arts-Saladdin University/ Erbil -Kurdistan Region- Iraq

Abstract:

Abdul Karim Qasim has on numerous occasions attributed the start of September Kurdish revolution of 1963 to the British and American designs against him because of his policy towards the British owned oil company in Iraq, and his claims on Kuwait. The British and American officials on their part have initially thought, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, is being used by the Soviets to destabilize the pro-Western regimes of the Middle East. However, a close scrutiny of the matter in the light of the newly published and recently released British archives do not corroborate the allegations neither of Qasim nor that of the Western powers at least for the start of the revolution. We maintain that Qasim's policy toward Kurds was the direct instigator of the rebellion. We also contend that Iran had been involved, to some extent, and it was the only external instigator at the beginning stage of the rebellion.

Key words: Kurds, Abdul Karim Qasim, Iraq, Britain, the United States, Soviets, Iran, September Revolution

Preface:

Abdul Karim Qasim has on numerous occasions attributed the start of September Kurdish revolution of 1963 to the British and American designs against him because of his policy towards the British owned oil company in Iraq, and his claims on Kuwait. The British and American officials on their part have initially thought, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, is being used by the Soviets to destabilize the pro-Western regimes of the Middle East. However, a close scrutiny of the matter in the light of the newly published and recently released

British archives do not corroborate the allegations neither of Qasim nor that of the Western powers at least for the start of the revolution. We maintain that Qasim's policy toward Kurds was the direct instigator of the rebellion.

As the rebellion goes on many regional and major powers became involved. We also contend that Iran had been involved, to some extent, and it was the only external instigator at the beginning stage of the rebellion. It appears that the British officials in Iraq had some contacts with Mullah Mustafa before the start of the rising in Kurdistan, but there is no evidence of direct or indirect British or any other external instigation or encouragement of the Kurds to revolt. This argument is going to be tested by utilizing British archives, which the author had an opportunity to view in the British National archives in London, memoirs of the statesmen who were contemporary to the events, and the British and Iraqi media coverage of the events. The significance of this study lies on its being an attempt to understand the present British and other western powers policy towards the Kurdish issue by shedding lights on their policy in the early 1960s. We argue that British and US had paid attention to their wider colonial interests in Iraq and viewed Kurdish issue as internal matter and of a secondary importance. . The paper will first address the main salient of Qasim regime's foreign and domestic policies .Then we discuss the events leading to the flare up in Kurdistan. The paper goes on to present different accounts for the reasons for the start of the rising. It is a political history based on critical content analysis and the events are chronologically treated. The study is a contribution to the existing literature in many ways. Although the events leading to the September revolutions have been treated in many works ,there is not yet a definite settlement of the question which external powers such as Britain, United states, and Iran had a leading, if any ,in instigating the rebellion against Qasim. This study will be an addition to the existing literature and an attempt to clarify some points rose by previous studies in this field and provides some revisionsfor the analysis provided by them. Douglas Little, for instance ,in his study, "the United States and the Kurds: a Cold War Story", journal of Cold War Studies, 2010, contends that both the Soviets and US had an intention of using MullahMustafaBarzani in their proxy war in Iraq, but he never presents any substantial evidences ofhow these superpowers had instigated the rebellion. Neither did little find any concrete data on British involvement in the start of the rebellion in 1961. Recently, an archival basedwork published by Arash Reisinezhad, *the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, points out toa wide role for the Iranian government - the provincialofficials in the border regions with Iraq in particular -in organizing and assisting the rebellion of 1961. Reisinezhad does not attribute any significant role for the British or the US in the start of the rebellion.Nowhere in his study, has Reisinezhad presented a concert data of Barzani's being in collusion with Iran in the start of the rebellion. Avshalom H. Rubin ,in his study, "Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization, Resistance and

Revolt, 1958-63" Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 43, No. 3 (May, 2007), pp. 353-382, on his part, addresses the start of the September revolution in detail and within the context of ethnic and tribal resistance to the centralizing tendency of Baghdad government. However, the author gives a lot of undue credit to the tribalism and the issue of foreign instigators has been treated in passing. Rubin makes some references to the recently released Soviet archives and memoirs of some KGB officials which point to the desires expressed by some Soviet officials to use Barzani Kurds as tools to start a rebellion to destabilize Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. However the author has not substantiated this argument by providing detailed information how the Soviets implement this design. In fact, the data presented by the recently published and released archives and the primary Kurdish sources portray a picture which points to the contrary; Barzani was hesitant to launch a rebellion to the last minute and he was forced to be involved in it as it will be discussed later by Qasim's aggressive and hostile attitudes towards him and the Kurds⁽¹⁾.

Salient Features of Qasim Era:

After a bitter schism with, Abdul Rahman Arif, his fellow conspirator during the coup of 1958 and pro-Nasser⁽²⁾, Abdul Karim Qasim elevated himself to the status of the "Sole Leader". Despite ⁽³⁾one of the major goals of the coup was to join the pan-Arabism movement and practice "qawmiyah" policies, Qasim once in power began to pursue Iraq's first policy. He was reluctant to tie himself too closely to the policy of Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt- and sided with various groups within Iraq (notably the social democrats) that told him such an action would be dangerous. Qasim as a Prime minister began to pursue a package of progressive social and economic reforms in the field of service, education, health and this had increased his popularity among the lower and the middle classes in Iraq but earned him the animosity of the powerful – landed aristocracy, which were hard hit by the agrarian land reform of Qasim and whose interests were tied to the monarchy and Great Britain.⁽⁴⁾

He further undermined his rapidly deteriorating position with a series of foreign policy blunders. Qasim soon withdrew Iraq from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Iraq also abolished its treaty of mutual security and bilateral relations with the UK. In addition, Iraq withdrew from the agreement with the United States that was signed by the monarchy during 1954 and 1955 regarding military, arms, and equipment. On 30 May 1959, the last of the British soldiers and military officers departed the al-Habbāniyya base in Iraq. Qasim supported the Algerian and Palestinian struggles against France and Israel⁽⁵⁾.

In June 1961, Qasim re-raised the Iraqi claim over the state of Kuwait. On 19 June, Qasim announced in a press conference that Kuwait was a part of

Iraq, and claimed its territory. Kuwait, however, had signed a recent defense treaty with the British, who came to her assistance with troops to stave off any attack on 1 July.

Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett describe Qasim's initial rapprochement with Kurds and later violent confrontation, which will be discussed below as, 'yet another example of Qasim's apparent incapacity to remain on good terms with those who should have been his natural allies' ⁽⁶⁾. Rubin quotes Hanna Batatu, the noted Iraqist, in echoing this view of Sluglett and thinking that Qasim "exhibited the potential to enact necessary socioeconomic changes and forge an ethnically inclusive Iraqi polity. Instead, he failed to keep his squabbling coalition of supporters together, and was ultimately deposed by more determined and ruthless Arab nationalists". Rubin writes "Qasim appears as a tragic hero. As a leader, he might have failed personally, nevertheless represented a positive historical trajectory. He may have yielded better results had he been luckier, more resolute, or more sympathetic to the Iraqi Communist Party" ⁽⁷⁾.

In December 1961, the Government of Iraq passed Public Law 80 reclaiming 99 percent of the Iraqi Petroleum Company's concessionary area without compensation. Falling short of full nationalization, the move was seen as a threat to British interests in the region – notably access to cheap oil - but the Iraqi Government hoped this would allow other oil companies the chance to explore for oil and thus generate more revenue for the Iraqi economy. However, other oil companies attempting to negotiate for new oil concessions with the Government of Iraq were kept out due to the diplomatic pressure from both the United States Government and the British Government ⁽⁸⁾. With this policy Qasim earned British government's animosity. He thought latter would do anything to undermine his regime.

Iraq was isolated from the Arab world for its part in the Kuwait incident, whilst Iraq had antagonized its powerful neighbor, Iran. Western attitudes towards Qasim had also cooled, due to these incidents and his implied communist sympathies. Iraq was isolated internationally, and Qasim became increasingly isolated domestically, to his considerable detriment. In addition to Kuwait Qasim had alienated himself from Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt who the most powerful and charismatic leader in the Middle East. The major issue facing Qasim was that of Arab unity. The union of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) ⁽⁹⁾ early in 1958 had aroused immense enthusiasm in the Arab world. Despite strong Pan-Arab sentiment in Iraq, Qasim was determined to achieve internal stability before considering any kind of federation with the U.A.R. In turn the Egyptian president, Nasser, came to resent Qasim's rule and tried to bring about its downfall. In March 1959 Pan-Arab opponents of Qasim launched an open rebellion in Mosul with the assistance of the Kurdish followers

of Barzani⁽¹⁰⁾. The bulk of the army remained loyal, and the uprising was crushed with little difficulty; Qasim removed some 200 army officers of whose loyalty he could not be certain. Among civilians he was forced to rely for support mostly upon communists, who were eager for a chance to strike at their right-wing opponents, the Pan-Arabs, and now pushed for a larger voice in the determination of government policy. Qasim resisted their demands, and several months later purged communist elements from the police and the army⁽¹¹⁾.

By 1963 Qasim's support as prime minister steadily narrowed. He had suspended organized political activity and repressed both right- and left-wing civilian and military elements when it seemed that they might compete with his authority. His rule was supported only by a small clique of the army officers. This situation, along with the discontent produced by repeated military purges, drew a number of officers into open resistance to the Qasim regime. In February 1963 Arif, assisted by the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq, led dissident army elements in a coup which overthrew the government and killed Qasim⁽¹²⁾.

Having first hit the Nasserites, Qasim had now attacked his major source of support on the extreme left. Quite where the reservoirs of mass support for his government would come from was anyone's guess. Qasim now stood as a dangerously isolated leader, who moreover possessed little family network with which to rule Iraq⁽¹³⁾.

Events leading to the flare up in Kurdistan:

Politically the point of departure must be Article III of the provisional constitution of the republic headed by Abdul Karim Qasim which emerged from the revolution of July 14, 1958. Article III asserts that: "Iraqi society is founded on total cooperation among all citizens, on respect for their rights and their freedoms. The Arabs and the Kurds are associated in this nation. The constitution guarantees their national rights within the Iraqi entity."⁽¹⁴⁾

In the early years of his regime, Qasim worked to undermine the power of Kurdish tribal elites, who had linked the old regime with Kurdish rural society. Meanwhile, he sought a way to bind the remainder of Iraq's Kurds closer to the state. To do so, he invited Mullah Mustafa Barzani, a Kurdish chieftain and an opponent of the monarchy, back to Iraq from his Soviet exile. Initially, Barzani proved a useful client. Qasim provided him and his followers with financial largesse and weapons. In return, Mullah Mustafa helped secure the loyalties of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and crush anti-regime resistance among Arab nationalists and pro-Hashemite Kurdish tribal leaders. By 1960, however, it became clear that Qasim refused to meet the expectations

which the KDP and Mullah Mustafa took for granted. Barzani foes argued that he reserved the right to make war on his tribal rivals at will, with or without Qasim's sanction. The KDP held fast to its demands for some form of Kurdish autonomy. Qasim thought KDP demands for Kurdish autonomy would have compromised the sovereignty of the state, and he sought to repress them accordingly. In the autumn of 1961, tensions between the two sides erupted into civil war⁽¹⁵⁾.

In his preface to Dana Schmidt book William Douglas writes "Whether Kassem changed his mind or whether his avowed policy was thwarted by the bureaucracy, I do not know. I suspect it was the latter, for the currents of hate, suspicion, and vengeance run deep in that part of the world"⁽¹⁶⁾. Dana Schmidt quotes tribal leaders arguing that Qasim tried to divide the Kurds against one another, "the way he had divided every other political, religious and ethnic group in Iraq. But with us he made his big mistake....We Kurds were his best support. It was thanks to us that the government got the riots at Kirkuk in the summer of 1960 under control. And we might still be with him had he treated us fairly instead of intriguing against us."⁽¹⁷⁾

As early as February, 1961 the confrontation between Qasim and Barzani became open. Barzani sent a memorandum to Qasim saying the Kurds' patience is growing thin about government procrastination with regard to the Kurdish rights and he is ready "to resort to all means to secure Kurdish rights"⁽¹⁸⁾.

It appears that Qasim had already made up his mind to end the influence of Barzani and KDP among the Kurds. Qasim was thinking the war will be swift and Barzani tribal foes will prevail and the Kurdish question will be out of his way⁽¹⁹⁾. Tensions between Qasim and Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani began after less than two years of the latter's return. Abdul Karim Qasim felt Barzani is more popular with the Arab public than the Arabs Qasim himself. Qasim has described him on several occasions as a mere tribal leader whom he can "pull the rug from under his feet, by applying the Agricultural Reform Law in Kurdistan"⁽²⁰⁾. David MacDowall provides a similar perspective. He refers to the existence of several interlocking struggles between various contenders for power during this period. At most obvious level there was clash of personalities. Foremost of these were Qasim and Mullah Mustafa. Qasim paranoid concerning his position and without a party organization of his own, soon found himself playing off one power group against another in order to neutralize potential challenger. Mullah Mustafa was invited back from exile and was determined to assume the leadership of Iraqi Kurds⁽²¹⁾.

Because of an incident occurred in the Rania, a Kurdish sub-district in the Sulaymaniyah, a Brigade of Iraqi army was sent to pacify the area. This led

to an armed clash . It is noteworthy that the people in Rania had filed complaints about the actions of government employees and police officers and instead of trying to investigate the causes of complaints by the Kurds, Qasim sent army unit to silence them. By June 1961 Qasim policy of reversing earlier inclusive policy toward Kurds has taken full strength .The Pro Qasim jumhuriyah newspapers began to publish article which denied the existence of Kurdistan and Kurds .In fact, some Arab nationalist went as far as saying Kurds do not constitute a nation . Kurdish officers in the Iraqi army were either transferred or expelled , Kurdish education was suppressed, youth and student Kurdish organizations were banned⁽²²⁾.

Consequently, on 6 September 1961, a general strike was launched in Kurdish cities. The authorities tried to pass some army forces from the Disband Khan Strait, to attack the mobilizing tribal forces in Sulaymaniyah. The army expected that this movement would lead to fighting. The war, started On September 10, 1961, the army launched an attack on several points. Although Barzani was reluctant to join the tribal rising, Qasim attacked Barzan only on the 18th of September 1961, where the Iraqi Air Force dropped bombs on it. With this attack the tribal rising against Qasim quickly took the form a comprehensive uprising against the government lasted nearly fourteen years. For all intent and purposes Qasim seems to have opted for Mustafa Kemal of Ataturk policy of assimilation toward Iraqi Kurd. The pro-Qasim newspaper called openly for such an assimilation. Pro-KDP, Khabat newspaper was involved in a series of articles to refute the chauvinistic views which were being aired in Baghdad⁽²³⁾.

The Nature of the British Involvement in Iraq Kurdish Question 1958-1961:

The British stand on Qasim and Kurds was dependent on several variables: the cold war between the US and USSR, Nasser's influence in the Middle East, and the desire of the Iraqi neighbors who had sizable Kurdish minorities, especially Iran and Turkey.

There was a general belief in Qasim's mind and that of the personalities who were close to him that his conflict with the western owned petroleum company in Iraq , Iraq's renewed claim on Kuwait, and the countries close ties with USSR, had to account to a considerable degree with the problem in Kurdistan. This pattern of thinking has a bearing on the both Iraqi academicians and politician who have dealt with this period too.

At a press conference on September 23, 1961, Qasim told Iraqi people “we have documents to show that the British and United States governments were behind the separatist movement which we had defeated”. Qasim repeated this concern to the US and British officials in Iraq on numerous occasions⁽²⁴⁾.

In order to evaluate this claim, which is still wide spread in the Iraqi circles, we need to present the wider the Middle Eastern context of the British and US policy towards Iraq and the Kurds during Qasim era.

The Cold War in the Middle East and Iraq:

The 1950s and early 1960s witnessed an intensification of the regional and international struggle in the Middle East. The main reason for this was the 1958 coup in Iraq, which was presented as a Communist plot, never seen before in an Arab or Muslim country. The USA considered what was happening in Iraq to be a preview of what was going to happen in the rest of the area, which would transform it into a Soviet stronghold. Qasim's regime was against western interests in Iraq. This was manifested by the mentioned Qasim's anti-western policy such as withdrawal from the Sterling Monetary Area and the Law No 80, which took over control from the foreign oil companies. He also supported Arab liberation movements, particularly the Algerian revolution against France. There was another Arab regime governed by a charismatic leader at this time - Egypt, led by Nasser who followed after his humiliation of the British and French in the Suez fiasco, which clearly exposed the latter allies of Israel and mortal enemies of the Arab people, by trying to unseat the Masonite Christian regime in Lebanon during the summer and autumn of 1958. This compelled the USA to send its troops to Lebanon to protect the Christian Masonite minority regime. After the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria, Nasser sent his troops to Yemen to support the Republican regime there against the onslaught on it by the Saudi regime. "Nasser thus appeared to the west as a man bent on destroying their interests and influence in the area."⁽²⁵⁾ That same year, the shah uncovered a coup plot by the head of Iranian military intelligence, General Valiollah Qarani. In 1960, the Turkish military overthrew Prime Minister Adnan in a military coup, and two years later Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal carried out a coup against the Imam of Yemen. They feared that either the Soviet-backed Nationalism could be used to America's advantage by channeling its ideological adherents in directions consistent with its containment policies.⁽²⁶⁾

It was this deteriorating situation in the Middle East which accounts to a certain degree for, President Eisenhower issuing in January 1957 a war cry, announcing his administration's doctrine that offered economic or military assistance “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political

independence of such nations. . . against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.” The Eisenhower doctrine was aimed not just at containing the Soviet Union but at Nasser’s radical brand of Arab nationalism.⁽²⁷⁾

Qasim’s coup had exacerbated the difficult challenge for US to deny USSR direct access to Iraq forcing it to adopt a more forward posture in the Middle East. However, the US stopped short of intervention in Iraq due to concern that any act of intervention or sowing discord would result in instability which might spark regional war and pushes Qasim toward USSR⁽²⁸⁾. “Given this the United States recognized the new regime in November 1958 and adopted a policy of seeking friendly relations. Accepting Qasim’s withdrawal of Iraq from Baghdad pact, and even considered limited military sale. In short, “so long as nationalists were in power, the Eisenhower administration could accept Qasim regime”⁽²⁹⁾.

Actually, Qasim had already, much earlier, accused the US of plotting against him; this had prompted the US ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar J. Gallman, to be instructed by the State Department on December 8, 1958 ‘to convince Qasim that there was no truth to the allegations that the United States was encouraging or supporting dissension in Iraq’. When Gallman met Qasim three days later, on December 11, Qasim told him that ‘the Kurds in the Sulimaniyah area were being incited against his government’ and that there was movement of individuals across the border with Iran. These ‘individuals’, according to Qasim, included people of both American and other nationalities. Qasim, therefore, was indirectly accusing the US of stirring up a revolt against him, including among the Kurds, and that, moreover, US personnel were involved in this. The ambassador denied the allegation, including the involvement of any US personnel⁽³⁰⁾.

A report of CIA on April 1960 complains that US was very ill-informed about Kurds in Iraq, and Gibson quotes CIA source which present the US as being ‘unsophisticated observer of events in 1958-59’ in Iraq and had no Kurdish expert⁽³¹⁾. In January of 1960 CIA report US and British officials have apparently told Iraq foreign minister that their countries had no intention to use Barzani and Kurds who have been⁽³²⁾.

As for J F Kennedy government’s policy towards Iraq during the first year was in many ways a continuation of that its predecessor; the Kurdish issue is an internal matter of Iraq and no US official should avoid any direct dealing with the matter. For this reason numerous Kurdish attempts by Barzani and his representatives in the west for help were rejected outright⁽³³⁾. Alvandi writes that Kennedy administration has asked Iran to keep hand off Iraqi Kurds because they wanted to placate Qasim’s regime and strengthen it as a bulwark against

communism,. Infect US secretly sold weapon during this time to Iraq which was used mainly against Kurdish rebellion⁽³⁴⁾.

The mentioned allegation of Qasim and Iraqi officials that the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion in September 1961 was an attempt by western powers to undermine Qasim's rule has unfounded bases. Gerges and Fawaz attribute the rebellion to the mechanization of USSR and point to the Soviet memo by Shelepin in particular to use Barzani to start a Kurdish rebellion ton distract the US and its allies from the Berlin crisis. It appears that prior to the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion mid- level US officials in Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara had warned their superiors in Washington of that Kurdish revolt is coming and it would serve only USSR interest. [However, "Kennedy administration did still did nothing...It was not until the Qasim regime expropriated the ICP concessionary holding in December 1961 that the US official s began to recognize Iraq's threat to its interest"⁽³⁵⁾.

The often quoted argument by Qasim that the US intervention in Iraq was through Iranian links with Barzani has equally no solid basis. In fact, it is to the contrary, whereas Iran desired to keep Iraqi army preoccupied in the north inorder to prevent it from posing direct military threat in the Gulf or to be involved in subversive activities in Khuzestan⁽³⁶⁾, the "United Sates wanted to prevent the Kurdish war so that Qasim would be less dependent on the Soviets⁽³⁷⁾.

Kurd said that KDP maintains "close and friendly" contact Iranians both in Baghdad and Tehran. Iranians have agreed not interfere with border crossings or to stop aid given revolt by Iranian Kurds. Mullah Mustafa pleased but also wants material support from Iran. KDP official said Mullah Mustafa believes proposal bring Kurdistan into Iran as "autonomous republic" is attractive to Shah⁽³⁸⁾. However ,the US ambassador in Iraq was not supportive of any move by Kurds against Qasim .He elegantly sum up US towards Iraqi Barzani and KDP:

. In regard to the Kurdish problems, and then of course the Kurdish revolts in '61, did the U.S. ever get involved in any way with any of the Kurd problems here in Iraq, or Iran

JERNEGAN: We've always tried to stay away from that thing because any intervention on our part I would have been viewed very dimly by the three governments concerned. And, of course, two of them at least, the Turks and the Iranians, are friends of ours. In Iraq, we had no reason to love the Iraqi government but we never did intervene. I'm pretty sure this was true of all parts of the U.S. government, but certainly it was true of the Near Eastern Bureau of the State Department and of my own feeling that there was no percentage in

trying to support the Kurds against the Iraqis because in the first place the Kurds probably couldn't., and in the second place it could have all kinds of unfortunate repercussions on the Kurdish situations in the territories of our two friends. And the prospects of creating a fine, free, prosperous Kurdistan -- independent Kurdistan--were so remote no matter what happened that even a humanitarian who wanted to crusade for Kurdish liberty couldn't have many hopes about it. The Kurds themselves had hopes, but there was no reason for the United States to share such wild ideas. So we were strictly hands off even though the Iraqi government didn't believe it. They were largely convinced that we were up to something by the fact that several of our foreign correspondents, newspapermen, managed to smuggle themselves into Iraqi Kurdistan, traveling over by way of Turkey

and Iran, and to spend a few days or weeks over there⁽³⁹⁾.

Like the US the British government had also discouraged regional governments from intervention in the Kurdish question.

The Kurds also maintain regular contact with the UAR, which was “friendly but unhelpful”, and USSR Embassy Baghdad. Barzani representative said Kurds were not willing “burn all bridges to Russia” unless they have assurances USG will support their movement. He said that he personally is given ID 1,000 per month by Soviet Embassy for certain Communist sympathizers in KDP but money goes into KDP coffers. Mullah Mustafa does not consider this small sum as assistance to movement. Kurds have asked Kuwait for assistance but Kuwait refused. British Embassy Baghdad confirms this. Said British have advised Kuwait give no money to rebels. Israel has offered assistance to Kurds in Europe but this refused—not because Kurds are anti-Israel but because they fear Israel might purposely reveal information and “movement” would be harmed throughout Arab countries⁽⁴⁰⁾.

A September 11 memorandum from Strong to Talbot describes the public U.S. position on Iraq’s Kurdish problem as follows: “The United States considers the Kurdish problem in Iraq an internal matter which should be resolved internally. Our Government does not support Kurdish activities against the Government of Iraq in any way and hopes an early peaceful solution will be possible. It is our understanding that some of the Kurdish demands include requests for the reinstitution of certain constitutional guarantees. While the United States’ position is clear on the desirability of democratic constitutional life, any comment on these demands in Iraq would be an intrusion into that country’s internal affairs. We believe the future well-being of Kurds in Iraq, as well as those in Iran and Turkey, is inseparably tied to the well-being of the countries in which they reside. We know Turkey and Iran share this view, and believe the Iraq Government feels the same way.”⁽⁴¹⁾

The British stand on Kurds was subject to their general policy towards Qasim which was initially hostile and willing to take a strong action in reaction to Qasim's policies which were harming their interest directly in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. Kennedy and Sir Macmillan British prime minister then had several exchange of letters and telephone calls in which the Macmillan was advocating a joint military attack to be coordinated with The Central Treaty Organization [CENTO] Pact members in order to change the regime of Qasim. However, the US argued such an attack on Iraq would provoke USSR to action and possible military confrontation. Britain realizing their past experience of unilateral action during the Sues crisis of 1956, was eventually forced to take US line of policy⁽⁴²⁾.

However, the dictates of the Cold war realpolitik and lack of an effective support by US seem to have convinced the British to avoid direct confrontation with Qasim and nonintervention attitude towards the Kurds in Iraq. On December 30, 1960 Kennedy's National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy sent the President a cable from the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John Jernegan, which argued that the U.S. was "in grave danger [of] being drawn into [a] costly and politically disastrous situation over Kuwait." Bundy also requested Kennedy's permission to "press State" to consider measures to resolve the situation with Iraq, adding that cooperation with the British was desirable "if possible, but our own interests, oil and other, are very directly involved." Eventually the policy which was adopted was of conciliation and avoiding confrontation with Qasim so that he will be forced into Soviet Orbit⁽⁴³⁾.

Therefore, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, the British ambassador in Baghdad, just after he left his office in Iraq, wrote two letters, one titled "the Rising in Iraqi Kurdistan" in which he argues that the Kurdish rising is due to Qasim's "initial mistake" in bringing Barzani back to Iraq from USSR to use him against his fellow nationalist Arabs and reactionary Kurdish agha. Trevelyan thinks Qasim had manipulated his allies and friends to make them subservient to him. However, he failed in this game with Barzani and Qasim's policy of divide and rule in Kurdistan created a chaotic situation which eventually led to the outbreak of the rebellion in September 1961⁽⁴⁴⁾. In a letter to British Foreign Secretary, on October 26, 1961, he categorically denied his embassy's any role in the rebellion. He attributes the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion to the "ill-management" of the Kurdish issue by Qasim. He further thinks that Qasim's accusation of British government was due to his failed policy on Kuwait which British made him look "ridiculous"⁽⁴⁵⁾.

However, British and American officials began to warn Iran not to promote Kurdish separatist activities against Baghdad. Both countries thought Kurdish separatism was unfavorable, and most of all feared that a Kurdish insurrection would drive Qasim even closer to the Soviet Union and the ICP⁽⁴⁶⁾.

According to McDowall upon his return to Iraq Barzani had on several occasions before the start of the rebellion approached British officials in Iraq asking for support from Britain for Kurdish rights in Iraq⁽⁴⁷⁾. In February, 1960 for instance British ambassador in Baghdad Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan and Barzani exchanged visits. Barzani and Sheikh Ahmed, the elder brother of Mustafa Barzani, reminded Trevelyan that they have been always a true friend of Britain and are willing to work with Britain again and they were disappointed with Qasim. In a letter from Trevelyan on Feb 29, 1960 British ambassador having met Barzani came to conclusion that he was not Soviet agent at all. But the British official told Barzani that they had come to see him only as part of the general British policy to meet all Iraqi leaders and political parties who had been legalized by Qasim's new law of legalizing the political parties. Trevelyan told Barzani in failing term that he considered the Kurdish question an internal matter of Iraq. Besides, before meeting Barzani Trevelyan had informed Jawad Hashim, Iraq's Foreign minister of his upcoming meeting with Barzani. Furthermore, the British officials had ordered their officials to limit their contacts with the Kurds in order to reduce Qasim's suspicion of Britain interest in Iraq⁽⁴⁸⁾.

British Stand on Shah versus Nasser in Kurdistan

However, Nasser also had an interest in developing amicable relations with the Kurds in order to use them to influence Iraqi politics and counteract the Shah's influence. Nasser did not want to "leave the Kurds" for non-Arab regional actors, lest they pit them against the Arabs under Nasser's control. Nasser was thus for a peaceful solution of the Kurdish Issue within Iraq. Contending with these factors and bearing in mind these considerations, the Shah engaged in an alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, and by 1963, he was considering the Iraqi Kurds, in his own words, 'as weapons' to be used as necessary against Nasser and his ambitions in Iraq. This not only referred to Iran's need to redefine its relations with the Iraqi Kurds, as explained, but was also to have a fundamental effect on the Iraqi Kurds' relations with the US. After the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, one of the choices that the pro-US regional states of Turkey, Iran and Jordan made, with US blessing, was to launch a military invasion to topple Qasim's regime. However, there was also a second choice. In his July 20, 1958 meeting with Edward Wailes, the US ambassador to Iran, the Shah 'felt strongly that Turkey should not at [the] present time invade Iraq' but nevertheless then suggested to the ambassador that if there was a lesser precipitous approach to the Iraqi situation then it would be to 'work with local tribes in Iraq, including the Kurds, to try to win them over to our side', among other measures. The Shah's views as shared with the ambassador here are consistent with other sources cited in this section on this, which thus constitute

one consequence of the Revolution regarding the Iraqi Kurds. On July 23, three days after the meeting of the Shah with the American ambassador, the State Department instructed Wailes to meet with the Iranian leader again and provide the following response. In reference to the Shah's suggestion that Iran could work with 'local tribes including the Kurds' to win them to 'our side' and thus influence Iraqi politics, the Department 'agreed [that] that might be worthy of study as means of influencing developments'¹⁰⁸ insofar as it related to non-military action. Therefore, while the regional states most concerned with⁽⁴⁹⁾.

The Kurds were viewing them suspiciously along with the USSR's related strategy in the region, primary sources denote the Revolution as marking the start of a partial change in Iran's policy towards the Iraqi Kurds, which was ultimately, by the early 1970s, to have profound implications for US views of the Iraqi Kurds, as the Shah ultimately drew the US in to back the Kurds in their war with Iraq. This it was directly related to the Cold War. After 1958, America and its regional allies were worried that the Revolution could pave the way for a Soviet push into the region or the takeover of Iraq by followers of Nasser or else communists; as for the Shah, Nasser and the Nasserites were 'worse than the communists'⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Iysa Pejman, The SAVAK liaison officer with KDP in Baghdad laid stress on the possible role of the Kurds in upcoming changes in Iraq and on the necessity of strategic investment in the Kurdish question to undermine Iran's western neighbors. Right after the coup, Pejman—now appointed as the head of SAVAK station in Baghdad—met Isa Zabihi, head of the KDP in Baghdad, to clarify to him Iran's new strategic turn toward the Iraqi Kurds and asked him to hold a secret meeting with

Barzani. Before that, he went to Sulaymaniyah during the Nowruz celebration and successfully convinced Jalal Talabani to join Iran's new plan. In the meantime, Pejman went to Paris to meet with an influential Kurdish cultural figure, Kamuran Ali Bedir Khan⁽⁵¹⁾. Furthermore, Colonel Bahrami, director of SAVAK in Kermanshah, the most populated Kurd-inhabited city in Iran, offered Tehran to use a provincial radio to mobilize Iraqi Kurd tribes along the border by highlighting the corruption within Iraqi communist organizations. SAVAK then launched a Kurdish radio broadcast channel from Radio va Televizion-e Melli-e Iran [the National Radio and Television Organization of Iran] in Kermanshah and Mashhad. SAVAK-orchestrated Kurdish Radio was an effective propaganda campaign to counterweight both Iraqi revolutionary propaganda and Moscow's new-founded Kurdish-language broadcasts. Managed by Shokrollah Baban, the Kurdish channel cooperated with several Kurdish cultural and intellectual figures, including Abdurrahman Sharafkandi (Hazar Mukryani). "Indeed, the Kurdish newspaper and the Kurdish Radio both helped Iran to resuscitate its leverage among the Iraqi Kurds. SAVAK also built a personal tie

with Barzani". Despite strict Iraqi-Russian security in Baghdad, Pejman met Barzani for the first time and notified him of the Shah's full readiness in support for the Iraqi Kurds.

Barzani immediately welcomed the plan and promised him to be Iran's "eternal friend and the Shah's servant." In return, he asked Tehran to avoid backing other Kurd Aghas, including Sheikh Latif Hafid Zadeh (Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji's son) and Mohammad-Rashid Baneh-ie who were both secretly supported by Iranian border guards. SAVAK then provided Barzani with a modest amount of ammunition and allowed him. At the same time, Colonel Iraj Mansourpour was assigned as SAVAK's

military attaché in Iraqi Kurdistan to monitor a strategic supply route running to the Iranian border. With SAVAK's financial support, two strategic military bases were built for Barzani's Peshmerga along the border with Iran. "The scene was set for the Kurdish revolt"⁽⁵²⁾.

We infer from these detailed discussion Kennedy administration had a detailed discussions and engagements with Qasim and Turkey and Iran . Before, September 1961 there is neither plan to topple Qasim or to assist a Kurdish rebellion against him. However, Iranian was using Qasim ill-policy toward Kurds and Barzani to put pressure on Iraq. However, this was supported by neither US nor British government.

The USSR Connection to Barzani Rising:

In early June 1961, shortly before the Kurdish War, the Berlin Crisis broke out. As the confrontation over Berlin escalated, Russian leaders began planning to turn the U.S. and its allies away from the Berlin Crisis and devise a strategy to create crises "in various areas of the world which would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the USA and their satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin." To destabilize Iran and Turkey, along with the U.S. and UK, KGB director Alexander Shelepin recommended employing the Russians' old ties with Barzani "to activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdistan that would include the provinces of aforementioned countries ..., [since it] evokes serious concern among Western powers and first of all in England regarding [their access to] oil in Iraq and Iran, and also in the United States regarding its military bases in Turkey." Disappointed by Qasim's unexpected shift and the purge of the ICP, the KGB saw the Kurdish War as a strategic asset to shake Qasim, "who [had] begun to conduct a pro-Western policy, especially in recent time." influential

Iraqi-Kurdish leader, whose activities had been at the center of concerns by Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian and even Syrian governments, was indeed a long-running KGB agent (code-named RAIS) from the end of the Second World War. According to Vladislav Zubok, in July 1961, by which time Barzani had returned to Baghdad from his exile in Moscow after the Iraqi Revolution, the KGB Chairman, Alexander Shelepin, suggested to the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that 'old KGB connections' with Barzani, now the chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Party, be used to 'activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran and Turkey for the creation of an independent Kurdish' state. Thus, it is clear that the Soviets were adopting a dual approach to achieve their ends: supporting Communists and also minority movements in the region. The latter were particularly favored as Communist⁽⁵³⁾.

However Hawrami Ali, in his well-researched archival study on Kurds and coldwar notes:

Soviets would support national self-liberation movements around the globe. However, while the history and Nasser's amicability towards the Kurds may have been influenced by the Soviets, there is no indication to show that the latter actively pushed for a political Kurdish entity or for this strategy to have been implemented. Certainly, one may conclude, there was by no means anything like wholehearted support for the Kurds. The very fact of the small nature of the aid, as mentioned, was very clearly vastly disproportionate, falling an extremely long way short of the amount that would be required to seriously set about the task of establishing a Kurdish state by means of armed force⁽⁵⁴⁾.

Before Mullah Mustafa's declaration of revolution in September 1961 he had traveled to the Soviet Union at an official invitation in October 1960, during which he explained to the Soviet officials in the Kremlin, the situation of Kurds, and the possibility of an uprising or coup against Abdul Karim Qasim, and appealed to them to extend a helping hand to the Kurdish people in all respects, and has taken a promise. It appears Barzani received a positive answer that the Soviets would send him sufficient equipment and weapons to be diverted to specific locations in the north-east to a site in the Valley near Mount Shirin North Barzan. However, the execution of the plan was abandoned for a fear of discovery by other parties.

After Mullah Mustafa returned to Barzan, he prepared a weapons stockpiling program. The Soviet Union acted as a mediator between the Kurds and weapon selling and provided the amount through the Mr. Naskov, the first secretary of USSR embassy in Baghdad. This was not implemented due to 'practical and political reasons', but instead it was decided that the Soviets would provide some financial aid to the Kurds to buy weapons themselves on the black market. The majority of the weapons that the Kurds obtained via this

means were of 'English and Czech 'origin. Between March and September 1961, 3000 weapons were bought and distributed in Kurdistan. Mustafa Barzani was already anticipating political turmoil or a military coup in Baghdad; thus, the Kurds were preparing for war⁽⁵⁵⁾. Barzani said USSR aid was sent to Barzanis wives from of Soviet origins not for Barzani. Qasim was suspicious of that. Iran was very upset too because Barzani promised not to have foreign relation without our knowledge⁽⁵⁶⁾.

It seemed the logic of geopolitical contest with the U.S., as well as Qasim's anti-ICP campaign, changed its policy. In a historically unique juncture, the Soviet international competition with the U.S. opened a strategic opportunity for regional powers, Iran and Israel, to side with a local leader like Barzani⁽⁵⁷⁾.

The US knew Barzani had received a monthly stipend of a thousand Iraqi dinars (\$2800 in 1962) from the Soviets. The U.S. also believed the establishment of an independent Kurdistan would destabilize both Iran and Turkey and provided the Soviet a strategic base at the heart of the Middle East. In late September 1961, the Kurds promised the U.S. to join CENTO to function as a "bulwark against the Soviet Union." Nonetheless, James Atkins, the U.S. embassy officer in Baghdad, rejected their request and called the Kurdish insurgency an Iraqi internal affair⁽⁵⁸⁾. In the early 1960s, while he was fighting against the Iraqi authorities, Barzani, via his representative, first asked the United States for some support for his fighting and reminded the Americans that he was also prepared to approach the Soviets in order to defeat Qasim⁽⁵⁹⁾.

This suggests that British and American officials were seriously contemplating to continue their course of non-involvement with the Iraqi Kurds, if Qasim would be overthrown⁽⁶⁰⁾. Besides, this also makes any previous covert U.S. involvement in the Kurdish rebellion even more unlikely. Therefore Andreas Viswires "I agree with the authors Rubin who had earlier stated that no US intervention was in evidence in Kurds' rebellion, and Stephen C. Pelletiere when he writes that 'there is no convincing evidence that either the United States or the USSR meddled in this first revolt of Barzani', and that even if some form of support took place, it is certain that no heavy weapons were delivered⁽⁶¹⁾.

Conclusion:

To sum up the allegations that there were foreign instigators for the Kurdish rebellion of September 1961 have no sustentative evidences to support it. Although the Soviets did plan to avail themselves of Barzani, for political and practical reasons they seem to have abandoned the plan. Iran seems to have assisted some tribal Aghas who were resentful of Qasim, but it was the internal reasons within Iraq and Qasim's abandonment of his earlier inclusive policy

towards the Kurds which stand to be the primary reason for the rebellion. British policy towards the Kurds during the years 1958-1961 was one of non-interference in Kurdish affairs of Iraq. Though it was willing to take a more aggressive policy towards Qasim, the British government was forced to follow the example of the US policy in Iraq which was to a considerable degree dictated by cold war realpolitik and Kurdish question was viewed by US as an internal issue of Iraq .

Notes:

- (1) Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*. Westview Press, 2004) .pp. 106-105; Barzani and most KDP politbureau members thought KDP was not ready in September for a military encounter with Qasim. However , few individuals within KDP leaders thought of using the opportunity provided by tribal unrest to launch a national rising. (see Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement 1st ed. 2009 Edition p,69-71; David McDwal, *A modern History of Kurds* , I.B.Tauris; 3rd ed. edition (May 14, 2004)p.308
- (2) Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian army officer, prime minister (1954–56), and then president (1956–70) of Egypt who became a controversial leader of the Arab world, creating the short-lived United Arab Republic (1958–61), twice fighting wars with Israel
- (3) Abul Karim Qasim was born in 1914, Baghdad, Iraq and died Feb. 9, 1963, he was an army officer who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and became head of the newly formed Republic of Iraq. Qasim attended the Iraqi military academy and advanced steadily through the ranks and by 1955 he had become a high-ranking officer. On July 14, 1958, Qasim and his followers at Free Iraqi Officers used troop movements planned by the government as an opportunity to seize military control of Baghdad and overthrow the monarchy. (see . Aziz Sibahi , *aqd min tarikh hezb al Shweyi al Iraqi , bahdad* 2004).pp.34-35,
- (4) The Agrarian Reform Law (30 September 1958[36]) attempted a large-scale redistribution of landholdings and placed ceilings on ground rents; the land was more evenly distributed among peasants who, due to the new rent laws, received around 55% to 70% of their crop .(Phebe , p. 188)
- (5) Marr, Phebe). *The Modern History of Iraq*. Westview Press, 2004 ,pp,164-65
- (6) *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*
I.B.Tauris , 2011.p.81
- (7) (Rubin.p.354).
- (8) Richard John Worrall (2007) 'Coping with a Coup d'Etat': British Policy towards Post-Revolutionary Iraq, 1958–63, *Contemporary British History*, 21:2, 173-199, DOI: 13619460600785416/10.1080
- (9) United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), political union of Egypt and Syria proclaimed on Feb. 1, 1958, and ratified in nationwide plebiscites. It ended on Sept. 28, 1961, when Syria, following a military coup, declared itself independent of Egypt

- (10) Qasim first called the army units to put down the revolution, but failed to eliminate them. He turned to Mullah Mustafa for help and assistance. A Kurdish gunman and were rounded up on the hill of Nineveh near Mosul and put themselves at the disposal of the authorities. To suppress the insurgency, almost 1,000 gunmen entered the streets of Mosul and clashed with Rebels. In response to Qasim's appeals, the barricaded crowds poured into Mosul to contribute to the suppression of the rebellion alongside the soldiers of the Third Battalion and were able to seize the arsenal of weapons. In the battalion, and after the end of the rebellion or revolution three days the chaos of the including large numbers of Kurdish and Arab tribes and reprisals against the rebel leaders and those who carried out the rebellion.
- See(Aziz sibahi , aqud min tarikh hezb al Shuye al Iraqi , bahdad 2004 . p,194
- (11) 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim | prime minister of Iraq | Britannica.com
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abd-al-Karim-Qasim>
- (12) Nasser considered Qasim to be a competitor and wanted him out of the arena, despite the fact that Qasim was supported by the Iraqi people and was friendly with the Soviet Union, which was Nasser's main backed. Nasser admitted, during the unity talks which he held with the Baathists after seizing power in Iraq and Syria, that he had paid money to the Baath Party to help it stage the coup. There had been before that a clear Egyptian involvement in the Shawaf 1959 uprising in Mosul. Nasser was also involved in the assassination of Qasim by the Ba'athists. Ali Sallie al-Sa'di admitted that Fuldd al-Rikabi received the sum of seven thousand Egyptian pounds through, who were then members of the Bath regional leadership, to liquidate Qasim physically. In addition to this the Egyptian radio station, Voice of the Arabs, was agitating against Qasim's regime throughout the area. See Uriel Dann, Iraq under Qassem, A political history, 1958–1963 (F. A. Praeger, New York, and Pall Mall, Ltd., London, 1969), pp,230-32
- (13) Richard John Worrall (2007) 'Coping with a Coup d'Etat': British Policy towards Post-Revolutionary Iraq, 1958–63, Contemporary British History, 21:2, 173-199, DOI: 10.1080/13619460600785416
- (١٤) "الوقائع العراقية" جريدة ٢٨ تموز ١٩٥٨ العدد ٢
- (15) Rubin p.354.
- (16) Journey Among Brave Men.pxiv
- (17) Ibid. p.67
- (١٨) ١٠١وزارة الداخلية / ١٤ / (م. و. د. اضبارة ملا مصطفى البارزاني رقم الاضبارة ٦٣) مديرية الشرطة العامة/ شعبة اركاتو الاستخبار اتسريوشخصي للراية العدد ٨٦. ١٣ شبا ١٩٦١.
- (١٩) (مذكراتفؤادعارف: الجزء الأول، تقديم. كمال مظهرأحمد، دهوك ١٩٩٩ م، مطبعة خه بات دهوك)
 (١٩٩٩ ص ٢٣٥ ٢٢ شبا ٣) الجمهورية العراقيةوزارة الداخليةمديرية الامنالعامالعدد ٢٧٨٨ (١٩٦١ الموضوع: تقريرخاص
- (٢٠) ١ فؤادعارف،ص٢
- (21) A Modern History of the Kurds - p.302
- (22) Rubin .p.34

- (23) ,barzani .p232
- (24) Ways of the Kurds Newsweek; Oct 16, 1961; 58, 16; News, Policy & Politics
- (25) Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or...
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/.../13537120500233714?...>
- (26) Bryan R. Gibson , Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War pp. 1-31 ; Roham Alvandi"Flirting with Neutrality: The Shah, Khrushchev, and the Failed 1959 Soviet–Iranian Negotiations" Iranian Studies, Volume 47, 2014 - Issue3
- (27) Matthew K. Shannon. Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017.
 256 pp. \$49.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-5017-1313-2.Reviewed by Roham Alvandi (London School of Economics)
 (file:///C:/Users/DELL/Documents/us%20iranian%20relation%20review%20art%20by.pdf
- (28) Wise, David (1991-04-14). "A People Betrayed: Twice before, Washington let Kurds die to promote foreign-policy designs. Now it's the Bush Administration doing the deed". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2018-02-01.
- (29) Gibson, Sold Out .p.29
- (30) Rubin.p.253
- (31) Gibson . p.80
- (32) the involvement of any US personnel. Rubin.p.253
- (33) State Department , memorandum from Executive secretary to /megoeorge bundy white House , march 7 , 1961 , <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/119/JFKPOF-119-011> ; FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXI, NEAR EAST REGION; ARABIAN PENINSULA 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
 Tehran, April 12, 1965, 1500Z.
- (34) Nixon , Kissinger . and Shah . p.73
- (35) Sold Out , p.55.
- (36) <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-006-doc1.pdf>
- (37) Alvan rohami ,Nixon , Kiesinger , and the Shah p.74
- (38) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII...
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961.../d49B>
- (39) John D. Jernegan, recorded interview by Dennis O'Brien, March 12, 1969, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program
- (40) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME XVIII, NEAR EAST, 1962–1963
 49. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State0
 Baghdad, September 20, 1962, noon.
- (41) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII...
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961.../d49>
- (42) Brandon Robert King "America's Search for Control in Iraq in the Early Cold War, 1953-1961"

- A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of History University of Toronto .2014.pp342-345
- (43) Brandon Robert King "America's Search for Control in Iraq in the Early Cold War, 1953-1961"
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of History University of Toronto .2014.pp342-345
- (44) FO 371/6118, confidential no. 89 , October 25 ,1961
- (45) FO 371/6118, telegram confidential no. 91 , October 26 ,1961
- (46) LaFantasie E.A., 'Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran', FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, Document 260, 623-624; and LaFantasie E.A., 'National Intelligence Estimate 36.2-60: The Outlook for Iraq', FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, Document 222, 517-520.
- (47) A Modern History of the Kurds, 310-311.
- (48)
- (49) Reisinezhad, pp.130-34
- (50) Quoted in Hawrami.p51
- (51) Reisinezhad ,p. 140
- (52) Ibid.p.143
- (53) 50. Andrew et al., Mitrokhin Archives II, p.175. See also P. Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks: The Memoirs of An Unwanted Witness (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1994), pp.259
V. Zubok, 'SPY vs. SPY: The KGB vs. The CIA, 1960_1962', Cold War International History Project
Bulletin, Vol.4 (1994), p.29.
- (54) The Iraqi Kurds, the Cold War and Regional Politics - Research Explorer
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/58489811/FULL_TEXT.PDF
2
- (55) The Iraqi Kurds, the Cold War and Regional Politics - Research Explorer
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/58489811/FULL_TEXT.PDF
- (56) Erfan qani ferdal , duai shat sal , p. 747
- (57) Disappointed by Qasim's unexpected shift and the purge of the ICP, the KGB saw the Kurdish War as a strategic asset to shake Qasim, "who [had] begun to conduct a pro- Western policy, especially in recent time." See Vladislove Zubok, "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-62," Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, No 4 (1994), pp. 28-29
- (58) Bryan R. Gibson - PhD Thesis - 11 September ... - LSE Theses Online
etheses.lse.ac.uk/720/1/Gibson_US_foreign_policy_2013.pdf
- (59) D. Little, 'The United States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story', p.68.
- (60) <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R001300180001-7.pdf>
- (61) PDF. U.S. Foreign Policy on the Kurds of Iraq, 1958-1975
[https://www.researchgate.net/.../283217908_US_Foreign_Po- ...](https://www.researchgate.net/.../283217908_US_Foreign_Po-...)

رۆلى بانگەشەى بەرىتانيا و ئەمىرىكا لەسەرمەتاي شۆرشى

ئەيلولى ۱۹۶۱ لەدژى عەبدولكەرىم قاسم

ئىكۆلئىنەومىيەكى سىياسى - مېژووى - ئەرشىفىيە

پوختە:

عەبدولكەرىم قاسم لە چەند بۆلەيەكدا ئاماژە بۆ ئەو دەكات كە دەستپېكى شۆرشى ئەيلول، لە دژى ئەو لەلەين بەرىتانيا و ئەمىرىكاو ھاوکارى دەكرىت، چونكە ئەو داواى خۆمالكردى كۆمپانىي نەوتى ئىنگلىزى لە عىراق دەكرى، وە داواى گەرانەووى كوئىتى بۆ سەرعىراق دەكرى. بەلام سىياسىيەكانى بەرىتانيا و ئەمىرىكا تىروانىيىكى تاييەتيان بۆ ئەمبار و دۆخە ھەبوو. كەپتيان وابوو مەلا مستەفا لەلەين سۆقىيەتەو بۆ دروستكردى ناسەقامگىرى دژى ولاتانى رۆژھەلاتى ناوهراسىتى سەر بە رۆژئاوايىيەكان بەكاردەھيئىت، لەگەل ئەمەشدا لە داوى خويئندەنەومىيەكى وورد بۆ ئەرشىفە نوئىيە چاپكراوەكان، ھەروەھا بەلگەنامە تازەبلاوكرائە بەرىتانيەكان و ئەمىرىكىيەكان لەبارەى دەستپېكردى شۆرشى ئەيلول، وامان بۆ دەرەخات كە فاكترەمەركىيەكان رۆلئىكى سەركىيان نەبوو لە دەستپېكردى ئەم شۆرشە. ھەر چەندە ئەرشىفە بلاوكرائەكانى سۆقىيەت بانگەشە بۆ ئەو دەكەن كە بارزانى بە پىلانئىكى (KGB) ھەلساوە بەم شۆرشە، بەلام ئەم بانگەشەيەش ھىچ بنەمايەكى زانستيانەى نىيە. ئەم ئىكۆلئىنەومىيە ھەو ئىكە بۆ دەرختنى ئەو راستيانەى كە عەبدولكەرىم قاسم لە سەرمەتادا تىروانىنى بۆ كورد باشبوو، تەنانەت چەند چاكسازىيەكىشى ئەنجامدا، بەلام لەدواتردا تىروانىنى بەرامبەر بە كورد گۆرا و ئىرانىش ھەولدا ئەم شۆرشە لەبەرژمەندى خۆى و لەدژى عىراق بەكاربەيئى و كەمىك ھاوکارى شۆرشى ئەيلولى كرى.

وشە سەركىيەكان: كورد، عەبدولكەرىم قاسم، عىراق، بەرىتانيا، ئەمىرىكا، سۆقىيەت، ئىران.

دراسة في الدور المزعوم للانجلو- الامريكي في ثورة ايلول ١٩٦٣

ضد الحكم القاسمي في العراق

دراسة سياسية- تاريخية- وثائقية

الملخص:

اتهم عبدالكريم قاسم الرئيس العراقي الحكومة البريطانية والامريكية بكونهما وراء بدء ثورة ايلول عام ١٩٦٣ الكوردية ضد حكمه. واستند في ادعائه هذا الى انتقام الدول الغربية منه وذلك لسياساته المعادية ضد المعسكر الغربي خاصة موقفه من شركة نفط البريطانية في العراق وتجديده ادعاءات العراق في الكويت. ولكن اعتبرت بريطانيا والولايات المتحدة البارزاني والحركة الكوردية في هذه الفترة بكونهما يدوران في الفلك السوفيتي لزعة الاستقرار في الشرق الاوسط . وأكد المسؤولون في الدولتين ان المسألة الكوردية مسألة داخلية ورفضوا ان يكون لهما يد في بدء ثورة ايلول. في الحقيقة ان ايران. وبخلاف الرغبات البريطانية والامريكية، كانت الدولة الوحيدة في تشجيع الكورد على التمرد . نحاول في هذه الدراسة الوثائقية ان ندحض الادعاءات العراقية في كون العامل الخارجي عاملا اساسيا في بدء ثورة ايلول ونبين على ضوء الوثائق البريطانية والامريكية بكون سياسة التنصل من الحقوق التي وعد بها قاسم الكورد عاملا رئيسيا في بدأ الثورة. فالدراسة هي دراسة تاريخية سياسية تتبع المنهج التحليلي للنصوص وعلى اساس كرونولوجي.

الكلمات الدالة: الكورد، العراق، عبدالكريم قاسم، البارزاني مصطفى، بريطانيا، الولايات المتحدة

الامريكية، السوفيت، ايران