

The Nature of the Turkish Response to the Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017: Analyzing the President Erdoğan's Speeches

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Abstract:

The Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum, that held on 25 September 2017, was not only an internal issue for the Kurds and the Iraqi state. It was also a matter of concern for the international society and more specifically for the Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq's neighbor's. For the states that have Kurdish population inside their borders, this issue was even much more sensitive, as it has been linked with issues like national security and territorial integrity. However, the fact is that, if the referendum could be having a direct impact on the Iraqi territorial integrity, for others this concern should not be interpreted exactly in the same way. This paper is an attempt to analyze the concerns of Turkey regarding the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum. It is aiming at finding out to what extent Turkey's concerns were studied enough and logical based on the fact that the Middle East is experiencing. The paper also asks how the Turkish policy towards the independence referendum and Kurdish issue in general can be interpreted. The hypothesis, here, is that what Turkey did in responding the referendum was an ideological-based act which was characterized by the Turkish nation-state and/or the Turkish nationalism ideology and also the personality of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Thus, the paper uses five speeches of Erdoğan, in which he mentioned the referendum in them, to analyze and then to find out the real reasons behind the Turkish stance against the Kurdish referendum. This would be done within the framework of political science methods of research - using both qualitative and quantitative methods too. Technically, the paper uses NVivo program to encode and then to analyze the data to an extent that could address the asked questions. These are all to find out why and how there was, and still is, sort of misunderstanding the issue of Kurdish independence by regional powers. The study concludes that, based on the numeric analyze of the used words, terms, phrases and sentences by Erdoğan on the referendum, the Turkish response on the Kurdish referendum was an ideological one.

Keywords: *Kurdish Independence Referendum; Territorial Integrity; State Ideology; Turkey; Erdoğan.*

1. Introduction and Methodology

Background: On September 25, 2017, Iraqi Kurds hold an independence referendum in Kurdish area - including both those where were under the rule of KRG and others outside it, which called *the disputed areas* between Erbil and Baghdad. The referendum was to ask: 'Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistan areas outside the administration of the Region to become an independent state?'. The voter turnout, as announces, was 72.16% and the Yes vote was 92.73%. The step was responded by Iraqi federal government, Iraqi neighbors, regional and global powers too. Turkey was one of those which rejected the step in a strong tone, both before and after the referendum. It was also taking economic sanctions and military threats as measures against the step (See: Mustafa, 2020; O'Driscoll& Baser, 2019).

The significance of the study: This paper is to analyze the Turkish stance on the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum. It is aimed at finding out the nature of the Turkish response towards the Kurdish step in 2017. The importance of this study is in that the study will discover the real reasons behind the Turkish stance, it will help scholars and politicians to know why and how Turkey was against the referendum in that extent. The study aims at clarifying the Turkish position through analyzing a set of selected speeches of the Turkish president, RecepTayyipErdoğan.

The questions of the study: The questions that study wants to address are about analysing the Turkish position on the independence referendum to know that to what extent the Turkey's concerns were logical and based on the fact that forming the Middle East - or they were ideological ones, based on Turkish nationalism and/or nation-state. It is about answering questions on how Turkey was dealing with the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum and Kurdish issue in the Middle East, in general.

The hypothesis of the study: To address this questions and to know the nature of the Turkish response to the Kurdish step, in 2017, the suggested hypothesis is that the nature of the Turkish response was an ideological-based act in which it was also characterized by the Turkish nationalism and also by the personality of the Turkish president, Erdoğan.

The methodology of the study: In terms of methodology, the paper depends on collecting and analyzing data aiming at answering its questions and achieving its goals. Thus, the paper chooses five speeches of the Turkish president, in which he mentioned the referendum, as the primary data. These speeches will be selected to analyze and then to find out the nature of the Turkish stance against the Kurdish referendum. This will be done within the framework of political science methods of research - using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Technically, the paper uses NVivo program to encode and then to analyze data to an extent that would address the asked questions (Edhlund, 2007, pp25-152). These are all to find out why and how Turkey had such response to the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum, and how this can be analyzed.

The structure of the study: The structure that the study will follow is that, first, it will present the collected data. Then, the collected data will be encoded and analysed in a way to be understood easily. Here, the main points of the speeches would be found and also the main aims of the speech would be clarified - it is simply about analysing the quality of the speeches. Following that, the encoded data will be analyzed in a quantitative way, in a way that the numbers can prove the hypothesis and address the questions. All of this will be backed up by informative tables, charts and lists of results and findings. Finally, the study provides a Conclusion to sum up what it was concluded in terms of its analysis. It, briefly, concludes the numeric analyze of the used words, terms, phrases and sentences by Erdoğan on the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum of 2017, as a good way to go through to find out the nature of the Turkish response on the Kurdish referendum.

2. The Collected Data: The Selected Speeches of President Erdoğan

This section of the study is to present the collected data which is retrieved from the primary sources. Here is where the study depends on to find out appropriate answers for the asked questions. This, of course, will be where the data would be clarified and also simplified aimed at transforming it into academic proofs. The main data to analyse is five speeches of RecepTayyipErdoğan, the Turkish president, that have been delivered in different occasions, both before and after September 25 2017, but mentioned the Turkish stance on the Kurdish independence referendum. The data here will be presented, encoded and analyzed in a critical way. Then the analysis of the content of the collected and encoded data will be presented via using the NVivo data analysis program. All of this is to clarify the nature of the Turkish response on the Kurdish independence referendum. Here is a table to list the selected speeches of President Erdoğan in which he mentioned the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurds, of 2017:

Table No.1

S.	The history	Occasion	Audience
1.	19.9.2017	72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.	United Nations member states and observers.
2.	25.9.2017	The International Conference of the Ombudsman`s in Istanbul.	Ombudsmen and deputy secretaries of 50 states of Turkey.

3.	26.9.2017	Opening ceremony for the academic year of 2017-2018, in Ankara.	University presidents, ministers, teachers, heads of institutions, ambassadors, representatives of universities, scholars and students.
4.	1.10.2017	The opening ceremony of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Parliament) 26th session, legislative year 3 in Ankara.	Members of the Turkish National Assembly and the ministers.
5.	5.10.2017	Program of meeting with opinion leaders and representatives of civil society organisations, in Ankara.	Kurdish tribal chiefs, dignitaries, prominent people in society and NGO representatives.

2.1. Speech No.1 on September 19, 2017

In his address to the 72nd session of the United Nation General Assembly, President Erdoğan referred in a single paragraph to the Kurdish referendum. He argued that there is an exploitation of the fight against ISIS by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to achieve its goals in the region. Erdoğan stated that there are also illegal basis in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) which will lead to the formation of new entities in the region. He added that this is now taking place in Iraq as well, in the sense that the Kurdistan region of Iraq has used the fight against ISIS in order to acquire territory and achieve independence from Iraq. In his speech, Erdoğan called on Iraq to find compromises based on territorial integrity and building a common future. He also appealed to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to reverse referendum decision, which is leading to new crisis and conflicts in the region. Erdoğan also threatened that ignoring the Turkish position could deprive the Kurdistan region from the opportunities that it currently has (Erdoğan, 19.09.2017, p.23).

2.2. Speech No.2 on September 25, 2017

Erdoğan's second speech was delivered at the International Ombudsman's Conference in Istanbul, on the same day that the referendum was held. In this one, Erdoğan was more explicit in expressing Turkey's position against the referendum. Despite the reference to their support for Kurdish rights in Iraq and a reminder of Turkey's assistance to the Kurdish "brothers" and their permanent standing with them, he described what was happening in Kurdistan as an opportunistic and disregard for other nationalities and communities in the region. He argued that 'northern Iraq' is not a place for a 'tribe' [meaning: Barzanis] or 'one person' [meaning: Masoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq], but a place of multiple ethnicities (Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs) and sects (Caldeans, Assyrians, Yezidies and others) (Erdoğan, 25.09.2017).

Erdoğan also stated that the Kurdish referendum is contrary to the federal structure of Iraq and the Iraqi Federal Court has taken the necessary steps towards it. He said that, partly based on what the Iraqi federal court reaches on the referendum, Turkey considers the referendum illegal and will never accept it. He also threatened that Turkey has begun to take punitive steps towards the Kurdistan region from closing the border and the readiness of the Turkish armed forces to intervene there to prevent the export of oil via Turkey. Erdoğan also referred to the rejection of the referendum by the international community with the exception of Israel, as he argued. He, once more, called on the Kurdistan region to retreat from this step (Ibid.).

2.3. Speech No.3 on September 26, 2017

This Erdoğan's speech was delivered to the community of academics, ambassadors and university students during the opening ceremony of the new academic year. It was on a day after the referendum when the results were announced. Here, the Turkish President was more sharp in expressing his position against the referendum. He stated that the holding of the referendum and the announcement of the results are of no value. Adding that, he will not accept the imposition of *de facto* as intended by the 'administrators' and that they are continuing to study imposing economic sanctions and military options on the Kurdistan region. He also said that Israel will not benefit them and will not be able to help them - as he pointed out that the Kurdistan region is characterized by ethnic and ideological pluralism and as the Kurds alone have carried out this action means nothing, but more suffering and new conflicts in the region (Erdoğan, 26.09.2017).

In the midst of his talk about the referendum, Erdoğan mentioned Turkey's support for the Kurdistan region when he was the Turkish prime minister. It was paying a loan of nearly 1.5 billion US dollars to the Kurdistan region in order to be able to pay the salaries of the public sector employees. The fact was that until the last moment, Turkey was mistaken in the belief that the KRI President, Masoud Barzani, would not take such a 'wrong' step. This is partly because of the fact that the relations between the two parties were at their best level in history. Besides, without any consultation or meeting with the Turkish side and/or considering it as a betrayal against them, it was not supposed to take such a step. Erdoğan believed that such a step should not have been taken, because Barzani had no problem there. Besides, it is not only a question of Kurdish rights, if that is really the case, then how about the rights of others; namely: Arabs, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians and Chaldeans. He also added that talking here about the rights of Arabs and Turkmen is not intended to be anti-Kurd, but to reveal the fact that goes back thousands of years. This step, he thought, means usurping the rights of others. In addition, the territorial integrity of Iraq must be managed on this basis and in ways that respect the people's preferences (Ibid.).

Here, Erdoğan offered a number of reasons why the referendum process is illegal; including (a) the lack of participation of Arabs and Turkmen, (b) committing various kinds of irregularities, from the destruction of population records to forced migration in places where Arabs and Turkmen are in the majority, (c) so the voter turnout and the results of the referendum are in doubt. Besides, (d) the process itself is

questionable, the only support for the referendum is by Israel. He also mentioned the raising of Israeli flags during the referendum rallies and also the celebration of members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) before the polls open (Ibid).

Erdoğan also referred to their ongoing talks on the referendum with the Iraqi federal government and the Islamic Republic of Iran. He argued that Iraq and Iran will not be silent about such a 'shame, distortion and danger' on their borders. The Turkish president called on the Kurdistan region not to make itself a game in the hands of the external parties; because, as he said, they will leave them in the end. Adding that if the peoples of the Kurdistan region do not abandon unity and brotherhood, Turkey will go with them side by side and even if it would be necessary they shed blood together on the same soil. Erdoğan stated that Turkey does not want to have to carry out its threats against the Kurdistan region and wants to solve the issue through peaceful means, so they have to give up the independence decision (Ibid).

2.4. Speech No.4 on October 1, 2017

In his fourth speech to Turkish parliament, on 1 October 2017, in addition to the points he referred to in his previous speeches, he, briefly, addressed the issue of Kirkuk. Erdoğan mentioned Kirkuk as city which has controversial connection with the international community. He argued that Kirkuk, in their view, is a Turkmen city, and threatening Turkey through this issue cannot be tolerated. He also added that the lack of statements by the international community in support of the referendum is very significant; that was why he thanked the international community for supporting the steps taken by Turkey, Iran and the federal government in Iraq against the referendum. He considered that sticking to this kind of separatist enthusiasm, while seeking a formula for security and prosperity in unity, cooperation and solidarity, is a betrayal of their own society (Erdoğan, 01.10.2017).

2.5. Speech No.5 on October 5, 2017

In his last speech to the Kurdish elders and tribal leaders and the representatives of civil society organizations, NGOs, Erdoğan addressed his speech especially to the Kurdish people in Turkey. It was an attempt to ease the Turkish firm position against the Kurdish referendum on the nationalist sentiments of the Kurds in Turkey. Thus, he focused on the Turkish - Kurdish brotherhood and that the Turkish state has no problem with the Kurds in the region. Saying that all their actions against the Kurdistan region of Iraq is to prevent the bloodshed between the brothers and also to prevent disrupting the unity of the peoples and to thwart the plans of some countries to dismantle the countries of the region - as they did previously against the Ottoman Empire. He, once more, reiterated Turkey's imposition of various sanctions on the Kurdistan region in a tone dominated by regret over the decision of the referendum. Erdoğan referred to the bill to be paid by Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen nationalities and other communities there as a result of the referendum (Erdoğan, 05.10.2017).

In this speech, he was more even sharp towards President Barzani and spoke with clear irony about Barzani's childhood dream of independence. He considered that this is an illusion and will never be achieved as long as Turkey exists. Erdoğan described the referendum decision as the one issued by a childish mentality and saying

that there was no need or necessity for this decision at a time when Barzani had the control of all things there - especially since they did not even consult Turkey about it. He clearly stated that the independence referendum posed a threat to Turkey and its national security; it betrayed the territorial integrity of Iraq as well - this was in addition to mentioning other points that he had already mentioned in previous speeches (Ibid.).

3. The Analyzed Data: The Content of the Speeches of President Erdoğan

Here, through analyzing the content of Erdoğan's speeches the Turkish stance on the Kurdish independence referendum will be clarified. It is sure that the Turkish stance was clear enough to understand easily; however, the purpose here is to know that this stance is coming from which kind of sources, and to what extent it has been drawn by the impact of ideological thinking of Turkish leaders, Erdoğan namely. It is about to know the ideological flavour of the Turkish position in rejecting the step. Through analyzing the content of the selected speeches it can be argued that President Erdoğan has focused on some terms and words that reflect the return of the Turkish position on the Kurdish issue in the region - especially towards the Kurdistan region of Iraq. This is a return to the 1990s and to the pre-improvement of relations between the two sides in 2008.

3.1. Denying the Constitutional Status of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq

Erdoğan has referred (45) times to the Kurdistan region of Iraq. He used (43) times a different name than the formal name of the region which is Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) or Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Alternatively, he used phrases such as 'northern Iraq', 'the local government of northern Iraq', 'the government of northern Iraq' and 'the administration of northern Iraq'. The use of these terms are kind of a designation that Turkey has long given to the Kurdistan region as an expression of its disapproval of the existence of a Kurdish regional government in Iraq. This was the Turkish policy towards Kurdistan region before the improvement of the relations between the two sides in 2008. However, in 2017, and because of the referendum, once more Turkey went back to the policy that it had before 2008 towards the Kurdistan region, which was delaying or at least rejecting the recognition of the federal region.

Erdoğan only twice used the terms of Kurdish and Kurdish administrations in his first speech in front of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2017. This could be explained as that the speech was delivered to the members of the international community, to those who recognized the Kurdistan region as a constitutional institution of the Iraqi state. Besides, it was when that Turkey believed that the Kurdistan region is not serious about implementing the decision to hold the referendum, as Erdoğan made it clear in his third speech on 26 September 2017.

3.2. Kirkuk, Turkmen and the Rights of other Components in the Kurdistan Region

In his speech on Kirkuk, Erdoğan focused on Turkmen rights and also the rights of other minorities in the disputed areas - the areas that were formally, but not militarily and politically, outside the rule of KRG and considered by KRG as Kurdish areas, and the referendum was being held there too. For Erdoğan, the referendum

was considered as a violation of the rights of these people, as they did not participate in the vote. Thus, the referendum was an expression of one group represented by the Kurds. Besides, the results of the referendum were questionable, as Erdoğan told the elders and chiefs of the Kurdish tribes that he was with the rights of the Kurds, but not with the “Kurdheti” or the “Kurdism” - a reference to the political rights of the Kurds. He considered that such attempts would lead the region to more wars, tragedies, blood, violence, conflicts and ethnic conflicts, especially on the Turkish border. He was referring to these alerts (25) times in his speeches - referring to the effects on the Kurdish people in Turkey and the threat to Turkish national security.

3.3. Underestimating the Kurdish Leadership and the Kurds

As was the case in the 1990s, Erdoğan, like his predecessors, tried to downplay the Kurdish leadership and its attempt to hold a referendum in Kurdistan. Thus, he used informal, ideological and even hatred expressions such as ‘someone, he, you, those, the dream of childhood, childish, Barzani, tribe’ (151) times. These terms were used in contexts such as that ‘northern Iraq is not a place for one person or his tribe’ and ‘they will not endanger the region and their country just because someone wants to realize his childhood dream of independence’. He also addressed the Kurdish leadership with ‘he, these, you, Barzani’ Without mentioning the official names or titles. Erdoğan also described the referendum as the dream of President Barzani (5) times.

3.4. Attempts to Justify the Turkish Stance Against the Referendum

In his speeches, Erdoğan tried to justify Turkey's anti-referendum stance. He considered that the positive developments on the Kurdish issue a threat to the Turkish national security and territorial integrity of the countries of the region. Thus, those terms, such as territorial integrity, unity, national security, borders and threats, have been received (38 times) in his speeches. He tried to link the PKK, described as a terrorist organization in Turkey, to the referendum. The Turkish president was referring to the PKK members' celebration even before the polls opened. He also argued that Israel is supporting the independence referendum of the Iraqi Kurds. This measure by the Kurdistan region, as he stated, is driven by Israel and other countries that have long worked to break up the region to control it. Adding that the Kurdistan region and its attempts for independence are just a game in their hands and will leave them alone once they achieve their goals in the region.

3.5. Labelling the Referendum as an Illegal Step and Threatening the Kurdistan Region

Erdoğan has referred (17) times to the *illegality* of the referendum. He also referred to their disapproval of it and its results or to allow the independence of Kurdistan from Iraq. He used terms such as ‘wrong, dissenting, illogical, questionable, innocent, betrayal, game, childish, separatist action’ (25) times to express the decision of the referendum by the Kurdistan region. This Turkish position on the referendum becomes clearer by focusing on the threat of economic sanctions on Kurdistan and military intervention if it does not return from independence. These threats have been mentioned (19) times in his speeches. Besides, listing a series of actions in cooperation with Iran and the federal government in Iraq have been mentioned (10 times).

This was the old Turkish method in dealing with Kurdish issue and was followed by the previous Turkish governments, in general (Erkmen, 2002, pp172-177; Bakir, 2017, pp96-98). On what is positive in Erdoğan's speeches on the referendum, there are positive words such as mentioning good relations with the Kurdistan region, talking about respecting Kurdish rights, standing by them in Iraq in previous periods, supporting peace and stability efforts in the region, and the like. Nevertheless, all of these were in the context of justifying Turkey's anti-referendum stance and pushing the Kurdistan region to reverse this decision and its consequences.

4. Findings

Based on the collected and analysed of data, some findings can be listed here:

4.1. Erdoğan's perspective on the Kurdish Independence Referendum

Here, it is to point out the Turkish president's personal perspective on the referendum decision by the Kurdistan region of Iraq; they can be summarized as follows:

1. The Kurdish leadership's fear of losing power; thus they decide to hold the referendum, so that they can guarantee their maintain of power.
2. The personal ambitions of the Kurdish leadership of realizing the dream of independence during their mandate - making history.
3. Foreign interventions, as some countries, including Israel, pushed Iraqi Kurds to independence, aiming at achieving their own interests in the region.

4.2. Erdoğan's Justifications for Turkey's Rejection of the Referendum

To justify why Turkey has to reject the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurds, Erdoğan had his own reasons, including:

1. The referendum threatens the national security and territorial integrity of Turkey and other countries in the region - as it affects the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Syria and Iran.
2. The emergence of new entities in the region increases ethno-sectarian conflicts and resulting instability.
3. Linking the referendum and the attempt to independence with the PKK, a terrorist organization in Turkey, and what is happening in Syria and the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD), one of the branches of the PKK there.
4. Violating the Turkmen rights and the acquisition of the Turkmen city of Kirkuk, according to Turkey.
5. Israel and other countries support the Kurdistan region in holding the independence referendum, as they are seeking to change the map of the region.

4.3. The Ideological Rhetoric in Erdoğan's Speeches

The examples of the ideological rhetoric in Erdoğan's speeches on the independence referendum of Iraqi Kurds, 2017, include:

1. Territorial integrity and national security of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
2. The referendum leads to more ethno-sectarian conflicts, crisis and wars on the Turkish border.
3. Military threat and economic sanctions on Kurdistan region of Iraq.
4. Disapproval and rejection of the independence referendum and its results.
5. The international community, with the exception of Israel, stands against the referendum.
6. Underestimating the Kurdish leadership and its inability to form and manage a state.
7. Listing the reasons for the illegality of the referendum; such as focusing on Kirkuk and Turkmen, violating the rights of minorities in the disputed areas, and the stance of the Iraqi Constitution and the Federal Court.

4.4. From Qualitative Data to Quantitative Results

The phrases and sentences in the five selected speeches of Erdoğan have been decided into the categories of ideological and non-ideological ones. The ideological terms were intended every paragraph or a set of speeches mentioned containing negative meanings towards the referendum and the right of the Kurdish people in the Kurdistan region to self-determination. Besides, the position of the Turkish state, that has always shown against the Kurdish case, represents the role that ideology can play in decision-making process of this state - nation-state. Nonetheless, the non-ideological phrases, paragraphs and sentences with positive content towards the Kurdistan region and the Kurdish people does not represent the national thought of the state, but rather reflects the positive relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan region, based on pragmatic interests.

The non-ideological rhetoric in Erdoğan's speeches mostly focusing on (a) the positive relationship between Turkey and the Kurdistan region, (b) providing economic assistance to the region in difficult circumstances and (c) standing with the rights of the Kurdish *brothers* and other minorities in Iraq.

In a comparison of these two categories, it was found that the ideological phrases in speeches on the independence referendum issue consisted of 120 phrases and 4,201 words, compared to non-ideological phrases consisting of 41 phrases and 1,157 words, and a percentage estimated at 66.95% for ideological phrases, compared to an estimated percentage of 18.32% for non-ideological phrases.

If anything, it shows the predominance of the Turkish state's nationalist ideological discourse in dealing with the Kurdish issue and the Iraqi Kurds' independence referendum of 2017, as opposed to the phrases that represent the reality of the positive relations between Kurdistan region and Turkey prior to the referendum, as shown in charts 1, 2, 3, respectively.





Chart No.2




Chart No.3

5. Conclusion

Based on what have been done in terms the research's questions, along with using the NVivo analysis program, and by following the structure of the research, the research could reach to specific results - as they have been listed above. Besides, the research can conclude that Turkey was against the independence referendum of the Iraqi Kurds, which was held in KRI and other Kurdish areas of Iraq, including Kirkuk and Makhmour. This can be interpreted as an ideological reaction of the state of Turkey towards the referendum and the Kurdish issue in general. The Turkish stance, in fact, was designed based on ideological criteria, but not logical and studied measurements. It has been linked with the Turkish nation-state's ideological issues such as national security, territorial integrity, terrorist organization - PKK, external interventions - Israel, and others. The study, by analyzing the content to five speeches of the Turkish president, RecepTayyipErdoğan, could reach to the point that the reasons behind Turkish stance on the independence referendum were ideological ones.

The fact is that the Turkish position on the independence referendum has been similar to Turkish positions towards the establishment of the Kurdistan region and the Kurdish issue in general since the 1990s. It is known as a stance which is mixed with the use of the language of threats and non-recognition of Kurdish political rights - including the right to self-determination. It has always been as curtailment of everything related to Kurds within the framework of the national security and territorial integrity of Turkey and the countries of the region, the Middle East. It, indeed, has been far from the fact of improving relations between the two sides since 2008 to prior to the referendum on 25 September 2017 - which was characterized by the acceptance of the official status of the Kurdistan region, its leadership and symbols. That is all, beside the improvement of bilateral relations at all levels, indicates that Turkey does not allow the political situation in the Kurdistan region to develop, as it looks at the Kurdish issue through a security lens and that is why it deal with it with the same

approach. Turkey considered referendum as a threat to its national security and territorial integrity. To change the Turkish stance/policy towards the Kurdish issue, the Turkish lens of seeing the issue ought to be changed from national security to common interest, and Turkish method in making decisions ought to be changed from ideological criteria to non-ideological ones.

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سروشتی کاردانەوهی تورکیا بەرامبەر گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی کورد ٢٠١٧: شیکردنەوهی گۆتارەکانی سەرۆک ئەردوغان

پوختە:

گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی کوردستانی عێراق، کە لە ٢٥ی ئەیلوولی ٢٠١٧ ئەنجام درا، تەنیا پرستیکی ناوخۆیی بۆ کوردی عێراق و دموکراتی عێراق نەبوو. لە راستیدا، بابەتێکی جێگە بایەخ بوو بۆ کۆمەڵگای نێودموکراتی و بە تایبەتیش بۆ وڵاتانی پۆڤه‌لاتی ناوهراس، لە ناویشیاندا دراوسێکانی عێراق. ئەم بابەتە، بۆ ئەو دموکراتە کە پێکەتای کوردیان لە ناو سنوورەکانیاندا هەیە، هێشتا زیاتر ھەستیار بوو؛ چونکە ئەمە پەيوەست کرا بوو بە پرسی وەک ئاسایشی نیشتمانی و یەکیارچەیی خاکەکیانەوه. لەگەڵ ئەمەشدا، راستییەکە ئەمە بوو کە تەنانت ئەگەر گشتپرسییەکە کاریگەری راستەوخۆی بکاردایەتە سەر یەکیارچەیی خاکی عێراق، ئەوا ئەدمبوو بە ھەمان شێوە بۆ وڵاتانی دیکە شۆڤە بکریت وەک ئەوهی ھەمان شتیش بە سەر ئەوانیشدا ڕوو بدات. ئەم پەيوەرە ھەوێکە بۆ شیکارکردنی نیگەرانییەکانی تورکیا سەبارەت بە پرسی گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی کوردانی عێراق. نامانجی توێژینەوهکە دۆزینەوهی وەلامە بۆ ئەو پرسییە کە تا چەند نیگەرانییەکانی تورکیا لۆژیکی و دیراسەکراو بوون و دۆخی ئەوکاتی پۆڤه‌لاتی ناوهراسیان تیا پەچاوکرابوو. توێژینەوهکە ھەروەھا دەپرسیت کە چۆن دەرئەنجامی سیاسەتی تورکیا بەرامبەر بە گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی و پرسی کورد بە گشتی شۆڤە بکریت؟ گریمانە ی سەرەکی توێژینەوهکە ئەوهی کە وەلامگۆیی تورکیا بەرامبەر بە گشتپرسییەکە لە سەر بنەمای ئایدیۆلۆژی بوو و ھەروەھا لە ژێر کاریگەری ئایدیۆلۆژیای ناسیۆنالیزمی تورکی یان دموکرات-نەتەوهی تورکی و تایبەتمەندییەکانی کەسایەتی سەرۆکی ئەو وڵاتەدا بوو. ھەر لەبەر ئەمە، توێژینەوهکە پێنج گوتاری پەچەب تەیب ئەردوغانی سەرۆکی تورکیای ھەبژاردوو کە تیاياندا پەردەواوەتە سەر پرسی گشتپرسییەکە. گۆتارەکان شیکار دەکرین و ھەوێ دەدری ئە پێگەیانەوه پە ی راستی پشت ھەلوێستی تورکیا لە دژی گشتپرسییەکە ببری. ھەموو ئەم کارنامەش لە چوارچۆی میتۆدەکانی توێژینەوهی ناو بواری زانستە سیاسییەکاندا کراو. ھەروەھا تێکەڵەبەک لە ھەروو میتۆدی چۆنی و چەندی بەکار براو. لە ڕووی تەکنیکیشەوه، سوود لە پڕۆگرامی سۆڤتۆیری ئین-قیقۆ وەرگیراو و لە پێگەییەوه کۆد بۆ دەستەواژەکانی ناو گۆتارەکان دانراو و شیکار کراو تا ئاستێک کە بتوانێت ئەنجامێک بدات بە دەستەوه کە وەلامی پرسیارەکانی توێژینەوهکە ی بێ بدریتەوه. ھەموو ئەمانە لە پێناو ئەودایە کە بزاندریت چۆن و بۆچی جۆرێک لە خراب/تێگەیشتن لە ناو وڵاتە ھەرمییەکان بەرامبەر بە پرسی سەرپەخۆیی کورد دروست بوو. توێژینەوهکە، بە پشتبەستن بە شیکاری وشە و دەستەواژە ناو گۆتارە ھەبژێردراوەکانی ئەردوغان، بەو ئەنجامە دەگات کە کاردانەوهی تورکیا بەرامبەر بە گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی کوردانی عێراق، ساڵی ٢٠١٧، لە سەر بنەمای ئایدیۆلۆژی بوو.

وشە ی سەرەکی: گشتپرسی سەرپەخۆیی کوردستان، یەکیارچەیی خاک، ئایدیۆلۆژیای دموکرات، تورکیا، ئەردوغان.

طبيعة الرد التركي على استفتاء الاستقلال الكردي ٢٠١٧: تحليل خطابات الرئيس أردوغان

الملخص:

لم يكن الاستفتاء على استقلال إقليم كوردستان في العراق، الذي جرى في ٢٥ سبتمبر ٢٠١٧، مجرد قضية داخلية تتعلق بالكورد والدولة العراقية. إذ كان في الوقت نفسه مصدر قلق للمجتمع الدولي أيضاً وبشكل أكثر تحديداً لبلدان الشرق الأوسط، بمن فيها جيران العراق. فيما يتعلق بالدول التي يوجد بها سكان أكراد داخل حدودها، كانت هذه القضية أكثر حساسية بكثير. حيث ارتبطت بقضايا مثل الأمن القومي وسلامة الأراضي. مع ذلك، فإن الحقيقة هي أنه إذا كان للاستفتاء تأثير مباشر على وحدة الأراضي العراقية، فإن هذا القلق بالنسبة للآخرين لا ينبغي تفسيره بنفس الطريقة بالضبط. هذه الدراسة محاولة لتحليل مخاوف تركيا بشأن استفتاء استقلال إقليم كوردستان - العراق، وهي تهدف إلى معرفة إلى أي مدى تمت دراسة مخاوف تركيا بشكل كافٍ ومنطقي بناءً على حقيقة ما يمر به الشرق الأوسط وكيف يمكن تفسير السياسة التركية تجاه استفتاء الاستقلال والقضية الكردية بشكل عام. الفرضية هنا أن ما فعلته تركيا في الرد على الاستفتاء كان عملاً نابعاً من أيديولوجية الدولة التركية القومية وما يتميز به أيضاً شخصية الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان. هكذا، أخذت الدراسة خمس خطابات لأردوغان، تحدث فيها عن الاستفتاء، لتحليلها ومن ثم معرفة الأسباب الحقيقية وراء الموقف التركي ضد الاستفتاء الكردي، ذلك في إطار مناهج البحث في العلوم السياسية - باستخدام الأساليب الكمية والنوعية أيضاً. من الناحية الفنية، استخدمت الدراسة برنامج NVIVO لتشفير البيانات ثم تحليلها إلى حد يمكن بها معالجة الأسئلة المطروحة، كل هذا من أجل معرفة لماذا وكيف كان هناك نوع من سوء الفهم تجاه مسألة استقلال الكورد من قبل القوى الإقليمية. خلصت الدراسة إلى أنه بناءً على التحليل الرقمي للكلمات والمصطلحات والعبارات والجمل المستخدمة من قبل أردوغان في خطبه عن الاستفتاء، كان الرد التركي على الاستفتاء الكردي استجابة لأيديولوجية الدولة القومية.

الكلمات الدالة: استفتاء الاستقلال الكردي، السلامة الإقليمية، أيديولوجية الدولة، تركيا، أردوغان.